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This article suggests that our sense of free will is formed when others react to our behavior with
surprise, even though our private knowledge tells us our behavior was determined by our preferences.
Such surprised reactions, even when our behavior is from our perspective fully determined, lead us
to infer that we exercise free will.
I. ROBERT NOZICK ON FREE WILL
In exploring free will, we will take as our starting point
Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations (1981, pp.
291–2) [1], which speaks of the problem of free will as a
“tension between causal determination and randomness
on the one hand, and valuable agenthood on the other”.
His eloquent statement of the problem (the reader is ad-
vised to consult the original) begins by emphasizing the
importance of “human dignity”, while relegating “pun-
ishment and responsibility” to the status of a mere “side
issue”:
Without free will, we seem diminished,
merely the playthings of external forces.
How, then, can we maintain an exalted view
of ourselves? Determinism seems to under-
cut human dignity, it seems to undermine our
value. Our concern is to formulate a view of
how we (sometimes) act so that if we act that
way our value is not threatened, our stature
is not diminished. The philosophical discus-
sion focusing upon issues of punishment and
responsibility, therefore, strikes one as askew,
as concerned with a side issue, although ad-
mittedly an important one.
After having identified the wrong way to approach the
problem (by starting with “punishment and responsibil-
ity”) Nozick then points out an obvious problem posed
by a belief in determinism:
The task is to formulate a conception of hu-
man action that leaves agents valuable; but
what is the problem? First, that determin-
ism seems incompatible with such a concep-
tion; if our actions stem from causes before
our birth, then we are not the originators of
our acts and so are less valuable.. . . There is
an incompatibility or at least a tension be-
tween free will and determinism, raising the
question: given that our actions are causally
determined, how is free will possible?
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Having identified determinism as incompatible with (or,
at least, in “tension” with) valuable agents possessing
free will, he then casts doubt on “uncaused” randomness
as a solution by asserting that each of us must be more
than a mere “arena” in which thoughts occur. We must
be “valuable originators of action”:
Some would deny what this question accepts
as given, and save free will by denying deter-
minism of (some) actions. Yet if an uncaused
action is a random happening, then this no
more comports with human value than does
determinism. Random acts and caused acts
alike seem to leave us not as the valuable
originators of action but as an arena, a place
where things happen, whether through earlier
causes or spontaneously.
Nozick goes on to say that free will must be “something
more” than mere randomness:
Clearly, if our actions were random, like the
time of radioactive decay of uranium 238
emitting an alpha particle, their being thus
undetermined would be insufficient to ground
human value or provide a basis for responsi-
bility and punishment. Even the denier of de-
terminism therefore needs to produce a pos-
itive account of free action. On his view, a
free action is an undetermined one with some-
thing more. The problem is to produce a co-
herent account of that something more.
Nozick, having criticized both determinism and pure ran-
domness as being in tension with our sense of our self
worth then gives this succinct statement of the core prob-
lem in the form of a hurdle we must clear:
Given the tension between causal determina-
tion and randomness on the one hand, and
valuable agenthood on the other, how is valu-
able agenthood possible?
He closes by expressing doubt about finding a “fully sat-
isfactory” solution:
The problem is so intractable, so resistant to
illuminating solution, that we shall have to
approach it from several different directions.
No one of the approaches turns out to be fully
satisfactory, nor indeed do all together.
2II. PRIVATE DETERMINISM
Nozick applies the word “intractable” to the problem
of free will with good reason: If our actions are:
• determined, then they are merely mechanical.
• random, then they are devoid of purpose.
Moreover, any mere blending of randomness with deter-
minism seems to provide no relief. To the extent that
our actions are:
• determined, then they are merely mechanical.
• random, then they are devoid of purpose.
How then to resolve Nozick’s “tension between causal de-
termination and randomness on the one hand, and valu-
able agenthood on the other”?
Introspection provides some insight: We as individuals
are capable of knowing more about our future actions
than others know; and, conversely, others know more
about their future actions than we know. When asked
to name a number between 1 and 1,000 we learn nothing
when we reveal our answer, whereas others learn our an-
swer for the first time. From our point of view our actions
are deterministic in the limited sense that we know ahead
of time what we will say. From the perspective of others
our choices are indeterministic in the sense that they do
not know ahead of time what we will say. In this way we
see our small pocket of the world as deterministic, even
as we find the wider world indeterministic.
So we identify the first property of what will be called
private determinism:
Property 1: We come to regard ourselves as
freely acting because we are aware in advance
things that no one else can know about our
future behavior.
This will be called “private” determinism for the obvious
reason that our sense of free will is assumed to arise from
our private foreknowledge of our own behavior. This fore-
knowledge will be regarded as evidence of determinism
because we know in advance what we will do, and there
is no way to know in advance an event that is random
(though, unlike with successful scientific predictions, we
appear to cause our behavior).
Good evidence that we actually cause the events we
imagine is provided by a simple thought experiment: We
begin counting from one upwards while waiting for an
alarm to sound on the decay of a radioactive atom. When
the alarm sounds we are to announce the number we are
thinking. No matter when the alarm sounds the number
we are thinking will be the number we announce, ap-
parently because it is the thought (of the number) that
gives rise to the act (of saying the number). In contrast,
in science we cannot keep counting from one upwards
while waiting for the results from an external physical
experiment and expect the number we are thinking to
match the experimental results as they arrive.
III. PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE
Should we find it acceptable to our dignity if our ac-
tions are determined in the above way? Yes, because our
actions are “determined” only in the limited sense that
we know what we are going to do immediately before we
do it. So our pocket of determinism is bounded in space
and time, and our actions are not determined from birth,
let alone from before birth. As John Passmore points out
in A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1968, pp. 509–519)
[2] in his interpretation of Stuart Hampshire’s Thought
and Action (1959) [3]:
. . . the leading characteristic of a free agent
is that he can tell us in advance — not by
inference from his past but directly and im-
mediately — what he is going to do.
In this way I regard others as free to act, with just myself
as a private pocket of determinism. In addition, my self-
worth—and sense of free will—is bolstered by my being
aware that I know more about my small pocket of the
universe than all others combined.
Moreover, not only am I uniquely knowledgeable about
what I am going to do, I am also uniquely knowledgeable
about what I have thought. Others therefore have to rely
on me to truthfully convey information about my prior
motives, just as I have to rely on others to truthfully
convey this same information about themselves to me.
We are not, therefore, just unique private pockets of de-
terminism, we are also unique private pockets of history.
We know many things about our past that no one else
can know. Of course, if my secret past drives my future
behavior it should come as no surprise that my behavior
is often unpredictable to others.
So we identify this second property of private deter-
minism:
Property 2: We come to regard ourselves as
freely acting because we know things that no
one else can know (except by being told by us)
about our past thoughts.
IV. ORIGINATORS OF ACTION
Moreover, I come to regard myself as freely acting be-
cause others inform me that I act unpredictably, and be-
cause I see others acting unpredictably as well. Were I
alone in the universe I would never get the equivalent
sense of existing as a free individual. In the absence of
the claims of others that I am unpredictable and there-
fore free (and my observing unpredictable and therefore
free behavior in others) I would always tend to see my
behavior as determined by my preferences. I ultimately
come to see myself as unpredictable (and therefore free)
because I see others act unpredictably in the course of
fulfilling their needs which leads me to draw the obvious
3inference that I am similarly unpredictable (and there-
fore free) when fulfilling my needs. I think: If they are
free despite following internal motivations then so am I.
And if my actions are determined by the past it is my
(private) past, not the (public) past, that plays this role,
where my private past is part of what defines me. In this
way I come to view my preferences and ensuing actions
as the exercise of free will.
So we identify this third property of private determin-
ism:
Property 3: Our sense of free will is formed
when others react to our behavior with sur-
prise even though our private knowledge tells
us our behavior was determined by our pref-
erences. Such surprised reactions, even when
our behavior is (from our perspective) fully
determined, lead us to infer that we exercise
free will.
On the surface it is plausible to dismiss free will simply
on grounds that our actions are determined by our per-
sonal preferences, which are in turn determined by our
personal circumstances, and so on. And of course this
leads us to suspect that we lack the dignity rightly re-
quired by Nozick. But in fact we retain our dignity in
the face of the above argument by virtue of our prefer-
ences being private. We would only lose our dignity if
our preferences were as well known to others as they are
to ourselves, because then our behavior would be pre-
dictable to others, and we would rightly be regarded by
others as lacking free will. In this way we see that our
dignity ultimately derives from the privacy of our prefer-
ences, where we learn about this privacy only from our
interactions with others. And if we do not exactly see
ourselves as “originators of action”, we can at least see
ourselves as the origin of the private preferences that de-
termine our public actions.
In practice I may first serially consult my senses (sight,
hearing, taste, and so forth). Only then do I identify
from among competing preferences my main preference
(inexplicably, I crave turnips). And only then do I take
action (I eat a turnip). Although these steps may seem to
be forced, their private character makes them correspond
to the exercise of free will. Of course, at times I may
be tempted to see myself as merely an “arena” in which
actions occur that are determined by random preferences;
but it is unlikely that others will see me that way. To
others my unpredictable actions will seem to make me a
true “originator of action”.
Does this then resolve Nozick’s “tension between
causal determination and randomness on the one hand,
and valuable agenthood on the other”? Possibly. By
providing a solution to Nozick’s problem that is neither
deterministic nor random—because this varies with
perspective—private determinism appears to neatly
sidestep Nozick’s dilemma.
V. PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
We are now ready to address the issue of “punishment
and responsibility”, properly postponed as a “side issue”
by Nozick earlier.
Imagine a serial bully who goes on a rampage: The
police never know who he is going to assault next. From
their point of view his behavior is entirely (and dis-
turbingly) random. Simply put, they see random beat-
ings. Ultimately he is caught and confined to a cell.
Thereafter his behavior becomes predictable from the
point of view of the authorities. From the bully’s per-
spective, however, the area over which he asserts free
will shrinks to insignificance: He is moved from cell to
cell against his will, so that even his own behavior be-
comes to him random.
This punishment is justified from the perspective of
society because he has interfered with the free will of
his victims. He imposed his will beyond his own area
of local control into the corresponding areas of others.
And because his behavior was “determined” only in the
limited sense that he was aware of his own motivations
and anticipated his own actions (something no one else
was able to do) this form of determinism in no way un-
dermines the ethics of imposing restrictions on his free
will. That is to say, he cannot plead external compulsion
as an extenuating circumstance because his behavior was
not “causally determined” by external force (which would
have made his behavior predictable). His behavior was
“determined” only in the limited sense that he under-
stood his own motivations and foresaw his own actions,
even as others did not.
So we identify this fourth property of private deter-
minism:
Property 4: Private determinism is an un-
usual form of determinism in that it amplifies
guilt rather than conferring innocence.
VI. INCAPACITY VERSUS DETERMINISM
One issue remains to be clarified and that is the
distinction between incapacity and determinism. When
we face an imminent calamity we usually ask: Can I
prevent this disaster? And when we are powerless to
prevent a disaster we may be led to think our entire
future is determined. But clearly physical incapacity
(powerlessness in the face of a overwhelming external
event) must not be mistaken for philosophical determin-
ism (a preordained outcome governing all events large
and small alike). Capable people who mistake physical
incapacity for philosophical determinism run the risk of
failing to act solely because they believe all outcomes
are predetermined. People who make this mistake would
be predictable to others and so would not be seen by
others as originators of action.
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